Procedural justice effects on self-esteem under certainty versus uncertainty emotions by Cremer, D. (David) de & Hiel, A. (Alain) van
ORIGINAL PAPER
Procedural justice effects on self-esteem under certainty versus
uncertainty emotions
David De Cremer Æ Alain Van Hiel
Published online: 8 April 2008
 The Author(s) 2008
Abstract Building upon the idea that procedural justice
effects are more pronounced when uncertainty is high, we
proposed that recall of an uncertainty-eliciting emotion
(fear) will render people more responsive to variations in
procedural justice than will recall of a certainty-eliciting
emotion (disgust). Results from Study 1, (n = 79 under-
graduate students) confirmed that a fair procedure (voice
condition) enhanced self-esteem relative to an unfair pro-
cedure (no voice condition) to a greater extent when people
recalled fear than when they recalled disgust. Results from
Study 2 (n = 147 undergraduate students) also showed that
a fair, relative to an unfair, procedure enhanced self-esteem
more strongly when recalling the emotion of fear rather than
disgust, but only when these emotions were recalled from a
self-immersed than a self-distanced perspective. These
findings confirm that discrete emotions that orient people to
interpret situations in uncertain versus certain ways are
important antecedents of procedural justice effects.
Keywords Procedural justice  Uncertainty 
Discrete emotions  Self-esteem  Certainty appraisals
The issue of social justice constitutes a salient concern
within most of our social interactions (Miller 2001). People
have been found to evaluate the justice of what they
receive, but an often neglected and maybe even more
pervasive concern that people may have is how they are
treated in their interactions with the dispensing authorities
(see Lind and Tyler 1988). In other words, people are often
concerned about the fairness of the procedures used during
the decision making process, and this is referred to as
procedural justice (Tyler 1988). Over the years, an
impressive body of research has demonstrated that proce-
dural fairness (e.g. being allowed to voice one’s opinions;
Folger 1977) has strong motivational implications, partic-
ularly because the enactment of fair versus unfair
procedures influences people’s self-esteem (for a recent
review, see De Cremer and Tyler 2005).
Self-esteem refers to the evaluation of one’s own social
worth and value and therefore, by definition, is a subjective
judgment that is influenced by social events indicating
social evaluations and approvals (i.e. sociometer theory,
Leary and Baumeister 2000; see also Deci and Ryan 2000).
The literature suggests that the enactment of fair proce-
dures represents one such important social event. In other
words, procedural justice communicates respect and
acceptance towards people and it is assumed that these
elements influence the motivational underpinnings of
people’s self and, therefore, their self-esteem reports (e.g.
De Cremer and Sedikides 2005, 2008; Koper et al. 1993;
Tyler et al. 1996). These social processes are consistent
with a symbolic interactionism perspective in the sense that
interpersonal appraisals (e.g. fair procedures) reflect on,
and can change, one’s self-image (Tice and Wallace 2003).
In a recent review of the justice literature, Brockner
et al. (2001) suggested that procedural justice research
should adopt the perspective to identify psychological
conditions under which procedural justice effects have
more versus less impact. Recent experimental research
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indeed seems to have adopted this ‘‘moderator’’ approach
to understand when the enactment of fair procedures
affects people’s responses such as self-esteem most
strongly. For example, studies have shown that procedural
fairness matters less when decisions are unimportant to
participants (Van den Bos and Spruyt 2002), when refer-
ence points are distant rather than close (Van den Bos and
Van Prooijen 2001), when other information like the
trustworthiness of the enacting authority and outcome
fairness is available (Van den Bos et al. 1998), when group
identification is high (e.g. De Cremer and Van Vugt 2002),
and when individuals display a strong need to belong (e.g.
De Cremer and Blader 2006).
An important conclusion emerging from this recent line
of experimental research is therefore that the effect of
procedural justice largely depends on how people interpret
information about the procedure. Importantly, however,
most of the moderating variables that have been examined
in prior studies are cognitive or motivational in nature. In
other words, in these experiments, the specific motivational
or cognitive state that people are put in determines how
procedural justice is interpreted, consequently affecting
their reactions. In the present research we propose that
procedural justice research to date has not paid appropriate
attention to the role of affective states in shaping people’s
interpretation and experience of procedural justice. Spe-
cifically, we argue that considering the moderating effect
of specific emotions can contribute to understanding why
and when people are motivated to attend to procedural
justice, and thus when procedural justice will have more or
less influence on self-esteem.
What about the role of affective states?
To our knowledge, very little research to date has focused
on how affective states moderate procedural justice effects.
In fact, it is only recently that procedural justice researchers
have begun to empirically address this question (see De
Cremer 2007, for an overview). Indeed, the only published
research that we are aware of it by Van den Bos (2003), who
focused on the moderating effect of one specific affective
state, that is, mood. Van den Bos applied the idea that mood
substantially colors judgmental responses toward a wide
array of social events (see Bless 2001; Forgas 2001, 2002;
Isen 1999, 2000; Martin et al. 1997; Martin and Clore 2001)
to the specific issue of fairness. This affect-as-information
approach holds that in the case of a positive mood proce-
dures are evaluated positively and in the case of a negative
mood procedures are evaluated negatively (cf. Cacioppo
et al. 1999). Van den Bos (2003) indeed showed this to be
the case, but particularly so when individuals were uncer-
tain about the fairness of the procedure.
The findings of Van den Bos are important because they
support the ideas that (a) justice is in the eye of the
beholder and thus subject to people’s subjective and
affective experiences (see also Barclay et al. 2005; De
Cremer 2007), and (b) mood impacts on fairness judgments
under specific circumstances (i.e. when uncertainty about
fairness information is high). However, it should be noted
that applying this affect-as-information approach (as Van
den Bos did) mainly shows that the valence of affective
states (i.e. positive versus negative mood) influences peo-
ple’s responses, under specific circumstances, but it does
not directly focus on why these affective states may evoke
different interpretations and thus different effects of pro-
cedural justice on people’s responses such as self-esteem.
We therefore argue that it is important when examining the
role of affect in explaining justice effects (i.e. using
affective states as moderators of procedural fairness
effects) to move beyond simply examining the impact of
positive versus negative affective states. More precisely,
we also need to explore what kind of interpretations are
elicited by specific affective states, consequently affecting
whether procedural fairness has more or less impact on
people’s self-evaluations. For that reason, we believe it is
necessary to distinguish between mood and emotions.
Emotions are different from mood in that they are dis-
crete, relatively intense, and short-lived, and are elicited
by specific events or persons (Frijda 1993; Russell and
Feldman Barrett 1999). As such, using emotions as a
moderating variable allows one to examine the influence of
affective states carrying the same valence (something that
is not possible when manipulating mood). Indeed, research
on discrete emotions shows that emotions of the same
valence (e.g. fear and disgust; Tiedens and Linton 2001)
reveal quite different effects on how situations are inter-
preted and how these social situations and events
consequently impact upon people’s responses (De Steno
et al. 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Rucker and Petty
2004). For example, research of Lerner et al. (2004)
showed that inducing disgust reduced choice prices of an
object (i.e. endowment effect) whereas sadness increased
choice prices (i.e. reversed endowment effect). Thus, spe-
cific emotions with the same valence may lead people to
interpret similar social information differently, and this, in
turn, may lead to different responses.
Therefore, in line with Lerner et al. (2004), we argue
that emotions often elicit interpretations or specific
appraisals that form ‘‘an implicit lens for interpreting
subsequent situations’’ (p. 337). Appraisal theory (Lazarus
1991; Roseman 1984; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth
1985) indeed suggests that emotions differ not only in
terms of positive–negative valence, but also at the level
of appraisal. Appraisals refer to how people evaluate and
interpret circumstances and events. In their appraisal-
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tendency theory, Lerner and Keltner (2000) further assert
that appraisals not only influence people’s reactions in the
situations that elicit one or another discrete emotion but
also persist beyond these situations (see Lerner et al. 2004,
for empirical evidence).
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) identified several appraisal
dimensions, including (un)certainty, control, and respon-
sibility. Particularly relevant to understanding the effect of
a discrete emotion on the influence of procedural justice on
people’s self-esteem is the appraisal of (un)certainty. Why?
Recently, Van den Bos and Lind (2002) proposed that
procedural justice exerts particularly strong influences
under conditions of uncertainty. Their uncertainty man-
agement model holds that people seek information about
procedural justice to reduce uncertainty, and thus predicts a
positive relationship between the degree of uncertainty that
people experience and their use of procedural justice
information. This line of reasoning is consistent with the
idea that, in our social world, the belief and affirmation that
one will be treated fairly by means of fair procedures
signals to people that society is stable and ordered (Lerner
and Miller 1978; Miller 2001).
Following this motivational model, we expected that
discrete emotions that elicit uncertainty appraisals is more
likely to promote procedural justice effects on self-esteem
than emotions that do not elicit uncertainty. Moreover,
examining the moderating influence of uncertainty-related
emotions is also important since prior research generated by
the uncertainty management model examined only cognitive
(e.g. Van den Bos 2001) or motivational (e.g. De Cremer and
Sedikides 2005) variables affecting uncertainty. Therefore,
one cannot be sure whether uncertainty evaluations based on
emotions reveal similar effects. Indeed, as Van den Bos
(2001, p. 940) notes, ‘‘all uncertainties are not the same and
cannot be expected to have the same effects.’’
Which emotions elicit (un)certainty appraisals? In sev-
eral studies, Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated that,
for example, the emotions of fear and disgust have dif-
ferent effects because fear was associated with uncertainty
and disgust with certainty. In other words, when people
feel fearful or are reminded of the emotions of fear,
uncertainty was more prominent in their minds than in the
case of disgust. Extrapolating from these findings to the
present context, it may then well be the case that the
emotion of fear (as a proxy of uncertainty) will make
people more reactive toward procedural justice information
than the emotion of disgust (as a proxy of certainty).
The present research
In the present research, we examine the following predic-
tions. First, building on the finding of prior research that
procedural justice has a positive effect on people’s self-
esteem (e.g. Koper et al. 1993), we expect a main effect of
procedural justice to be such that voice will reveal higher
self-esteem than no voice (Hypothesis 1). Further, in line
with the idea that uncertainty should moderate procedural
justice effects (Van den Bos and Lind 2002), we expect
that specific emotions acting as a proxy of certainty versus
uncertainty will moderate the expected main effect of
procedural justice (Hypothesis 2). More precisely, we
predict a two-way interaction in such a way that the effect
of procedural justice will be stronger when the emotion of
fear is made accessible relative to the emotion of disgust,
because fear can be considered to represent an uncertainty
state, whereas disgust represents a certainty state.
Procedural justice will be manipulated by using the
manipulation of voice (Folger 1977; Lind et al. 1990; Van
den Bos 1999). Voice refers to a situation in which par-
ticipants may or may not be allowed to provide input (e.g.
opinion) to the decision making process. Having voice is
associated with high perceptions of fairness in procedures
(McFarlin and Sweeney 1996) and is the most commonly
used operationalization of procedural justice in the litera-
ture (Van den Bos 1999).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design
Seventy-nine undergraduate students (54 females and 25
males, average age = 19.94 years, SD = 1.86) participated
voluntarily in exchange for course credits. They were
randomly assigned to a 2 (Emotion: Disgust versus
fear) 9 2 (Procedural justice: Voice versus no voice)
between-subjects factorial design.
Experimental procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in a
separate experimental cubicle containing a table, a chair, a
pen, and a booklet including all the experimental materials.
We told participants to open the booklet and read the
experimental instructions carefully.
At the first page of the booklet we explained to partic-
ipants that some researchers at the department were
interested in autobiographical memories about emotional
events and that therefore they would first participate in a
study about memories that was unrelated to the next study.
This first study actually constituted the emotion manipu-
lation and was adapted from Strack et al. (1985) and
modeled after Tiedens and Linton (2001). Following Tie-
dens and Linton (2001), we used the emotions of fear and
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disgust to induce uncertainty and certainty appraisals,
respectively. Participants in the disgust condition were
asked to remember and vividly recall an event that made
them feel disgusted. In the fear condition, participants were
asked to recall an event that made them feel afraid. To test
our assumption that the emotions of disgust versus fear
acted as proxies of certainty versus uncertainty, respec-
tively, we then asked participants the following question,
‘‘how well could you predict what would happen next
when you felt disgusted/afraid’’ (taken from Smith and
Ellsworth 1985; see also Tiedens and Linton 2001). Par-
ticipants responded to this questionnaire on an 11-point
scale (1 = not at all, 11 = very much so).
After participants finished the ‘first study’, they were
told that they would participate together with other students
in a second study. In this study, they would engage in a
brainstorming session with other students during which
they would discuss topics that are of importance to the
university and its students. Then, a list of possible topics
was introduced by the researcher: (1) Binding study advice
(whether students have to be evaluated after their first year
to see whether or not they can proceed), (2) Life on campus
(whether their university campus should be made more
attractive, and how), and (3) The lack of student rooms in
their city. Participants were told that only one topic could
be discussed. They were then informed about the procedure
that would be used to select the discussion topic. This
constituted the procedural justice manipulation. Half of the
participants read a note that they would be given the
opportunity to voice their opinion with respect to which
topic to choose. Then, they were asked to write down
which topic that they wanted to select and why (voice
condition). The other half of the participants read that they
would not be given the opportunity to voice their opinion
with respect to which topic to choose (no voice condition).
Then, the dependent measures of experiment 1 were
solicited. First, participants were asked to write down
which emotion they had. Participants responded to the
remaining questions on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all,
7 = very much so). To check the procedural justice
manipulation, participants rated the degree to which opin-
ion was considered. Self-esteem was assessed by asking
participants to rate the degree to which they evaluated
themselves as ‘‘respected’’, ‘‘valued’’, and ‘‘less than oth-
ers’’ (reversed). These items were taken from prior justice
research (De Cremer and Sedikides 2008; De Cremer and
Tyler 2005) and from scales assessing relational and social
dimensions of self-esteem (Leary et al. 2001; McFarland
and Ross 1982; Heatherton and Polivy 1991; Routledge
et al. 2007, Nostalgia proneness and nostalgia functions,
unpublished). They were combined to produce an average
self-esteem score (Cronbach’s a = .82). Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Manipulation checks
Two judges coded whether participants indeed described
the emotion of fear versus disgust as prescribed by their
experimental condition. The judges agreed in coding the
emotions as shown in the high inter-rater agreement,
Cohen’s Kappa = .90. Moreover, all participants described
the emotion that was prescribed for by their experimental
condition. A 2 (Emotion) 9 2 (Procedural justice)
ANOVA on the certainty-uncertainty appraisal question
yielded only a significant main effect of Emotion, F(1,
75) = 12.40, p \ .001, g2 = .14. Participants judged the
situation to be more predictable in the disgust than in the
fear condition (Ms = 5.92 vs. 3.77, SDs = 2.91 and 2.49,
respectively). A 2 9 2 ANOVA on participants’ rating of
the degree to which their opinion was considered revealed
only a significant effect of Procedural justice, F(1,
75) = 75.09, p \ .001, g2 = .50. Participants felt they were
given more consideration in the voice relative to the no
voice condition (Ms = 5.83 vs. 2.83, SDs = 0.77 and 2.07,
respectively).
Self-esteem
A 2 9 2 ANOVA on the average self-esteem score yiel-
ded, in line with Hypothesis 1 that procedural justice will
have a positive influence on self-esteem, a significant main
effect of procedural justice, F(1, 75) = 81.80, p \ .001,
g2 = .52: Participants in the voice condition indeed repor-
ted higher self-esteem than those in the no voice condition
(Ms = 5.69 vs. 3.70, SDs = 0.79 and 1.24, respectively).
Interestingly, there was also a significant main effect of
emotion, F(1, 75) = 7.40, p \ .01, g2 = .09: Participants
in the disgust condition reported higher self-esteem than
those in the fear condition (Ms = 5.00 vs. 4.40,
SDs = 1.24 and 1.56, respectively).
Finally, there was a significant effect for the interaction
between emotion and procedural justice, F(1, 75) = 3.96,
p = .05, g2 = .05 (see Table 1). As expected, analyses of
the effect of procedural justice at each level of the
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of self-esteem as a function
of emotion and procedural justice
Dependent variable Emotion
Procedural justice Fear Disgust
Self-esteem Voice 5.61a (0.84) 5.77a (0.75)
No voice 3.18c (1.08) 4.22b (1.19)
Note: A higher score indicates higher self-esteem. Standard deviations
are given in parentheses. Means with a different subscript differ at
p \ .05
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independent variable emotion showed that procedural jus-
tice revealed a stronger significant effect (see effect sizes)
among those in the fear (uncertainty) condition, F(1,
75) = 61.85, p \ .001, g2 = .45, than those in the disgust
(certainty) condition, F(1, 75) = 24.50, p \ .001, g2 = .24.
In line with Hypothesis 2, self-esteem was higher in the
voice than in the no voice condition, and this effect was
more pronounced when the emotion of fear rather than
disgust was recalled. Additional analyses of the effect of
emotion in each condition of procedural justice also
showed that the effect of emotion was significant in the no
voice condition, F(1, 75) = 10.68, p \ .005, but not in the
voice condition, F(1, 75) = .28, p \ .61. In other words, in
the no voice condition, self-esteem was higher in the
condition of disgust than in the condition of fear. We will
return to this finding in the general discussion.
Experiment 2
The findings of Experiment 1 indicated that the procedural
justice manipulation influenced self-esteem more strongly
when people recalled the emotion of fear, which induces
higher appraisals of uncertainty, than when they recalled
disgust. To the best of our knowledge, this demonstration
of the moderating effect of discrete emotions such as fear
and disgust is the first of its kind. Moreover, this significant
effect supports our proposal that integrating insights from
the appraisal and procedural justice literatures can con-
tribute to understanding the role of uncertainty in
procedural justice effects.
In Experiment 2 participants’ self-esteem again served as
the dependent measure. The main objective was to examine
whether the moderating effect of emotions will be partic-
ularly marked when the emotion is mentally experienced in
a self-relevant manner. This proposal rests on two kinds of
considerations. First, De Cremer and Sedikides (2005)
showed that uncertainty related to the self was associated
with strong procedural justice effects. Second, recent evi-
dence shows that justice effects become more pronounced
and stronger when people focus on the self (see Skitka
2003). We thus predicted that fear will reveal stronger
procedural justice effects than disgust, but particularly
when these emotions are recalled under conditions of
attention to the self. Conversely, we predicted that this
interaction effect between uncertainty (i.e. fear) versus
certainty related (i.e. disgust) emotions and procedural
justice will not emerge when people do not focus on the self.
The manipulation of self-focus relied on recent research
demonstrating that emotional experiences can be recalled
in ways that reflect different self-immersed versus self-
distanced perspectives (see Kross et al. 2005). A self-
immersed perspective makes people focus on the specific
features of the recalled emotion and relive the situation
(McIsaac and Eich 2004). In contrast, a self-distanced
perspective puts people more in a reflective mode in which
they process the emotion more from a third-person per-
spective (Robinson and Swanson 1993).
To summarize, in addition to a main effect of procedural
justice (Hypothesis 1) and a two-way interaction between
procedural justice and emotion (Hypothesis 2), as examined
in Experiment 1, we anticipated a three-way interaction
between procedural justice, emotion and type of self-per-
spective (Hypothesis 3). Specifically, we predicted that the
moderating influence of fear relative to disgust on the
positive effect of voice procedures on self-esteem would
be stronger when participants recalled the emotion from a
self-immersed relative to a self-distanced perspective.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 147 undergraduate students (66 men and
81 women; average age = 20.80 years, SD = 2.97) who
participated voluntarily and were each paid 7 Euros. They
were randomly assigned to a 2 (Perspective: Self-immersed
versus self-distanced) 9 2 (Emotion: Disgust versus
fear) 9 2 (Procedural justice: Voice versus no voice)
between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were directed to
a cubicle containing a table, chair, pen, and computer. All
information was communicated via the computer. As in
Experiment 1, participants were first told that they would
participate in a first (unrelated) study and were asked to
recall a situation of fear relative to disgust. The type of
self-perspective manipulation was then introduced (taken
from Kross et al. 2005). Instructions for the self-immersed
perspective condition were ‘‘ ‘‘go back to the situation
described and relive the situation as if it were happening to
you all over again ....’’ Instructions for the self-distanced
perspective were ‘‘ take a few steps back and move away
from your experience ... watch the situation in such a way
as if it were happening all over again to the distant you.’’
As in Experiment 1, (un)certainty was assessed by asking
participants to rate how well they could predict what would
happen next when they felt disgusted/afraid’’. In addition,
two items assessed whether the autobiographical memory
task elicited the emotion that was described: ‘‘To what
extent do you feel disgust at the moment’’, and ‘‘to what
extent do you feel fear at the moment.’’
Participants then participated in the ‘‘second’’ study.
Procedures, which included the procedural justice
282 Motiv Emot (2008) 32:278–287
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manipulation, were as described for Experiment 1. There-
after, the dependent measures of experiment 2 were
solicited. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much so), ranging from not at all
(1) to very much so (7). The validity of the procedural
justice manipulation and the emotion manipulation were
assessed as described for Experiment 1. In addition,
because in Experiment 1 we did not check whether our
voice manipulation indeed elicited a sense of fairness, in
Experiment 2, participants rated how ‘‘fairly’’ and ‘‘justly’’
they felt treated (r = .89, p \ .001). Self-esteem was then
assessed by asking participants to what extent they evalu-
ated themselves as someone ‘‘valued’’, and ‘‘proud of him
or herself’’ (taken from De Cremer and Sedikides 2008;
Tyler et al. 1996; r = .61, p \ .001). Finally, participants
were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Manipulation checks
Two judges coded whether participants indeed described
the emotion of fear versus disgust as prescribed by their
experimental condition. The judges agreed in coding the
emotions as shown in the high inter-rater agreement,
Cohen’s Kappa = .86. Moreover, all participants described
the emotion that was prescribed for by their experimental
condition. Further, two judges also coded whether partici-
pants adopted a self-immersed perspective or a self-
distanced perspective as prescribed by their experimental
condition. This time the judges also showed high agree-
ment as shown in the high inter-rater agreement, Cohen’s
Kappa = .85.
A 2 (perspective) 9 2 (emotion) 9 2 (procedural jus-
tice) ANOVA on the disgust question yielded only a
significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 139) = 12.60,
p \ .001, g2 = .08: Participants in the disgust condition felt
more disgusted than those in the fear condition
(Ms = 6.33 vs. 1.89, SDs = 1.09 and 1.45, respectively).
A 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA on the fear question yielded only a
significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 139) = 108.05,
p \ .001, g2 = .44: Participants in the fear condition felt
more fearful than those in the disgust condition
(Ms = 5.56 vs. 2.79, SDs = 1.24 and 1.86, respectively).
A 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA on the certainty-uncertainty
appraisal revealed only a significant main effect of emo-
tion, F(1, 139) = 12.60, p \ .001, g2 = .08: Participants in
the disgust condition evaluated that they could predict what
would happen next much better than among those in the
fear condition (Ms = 5.66 vs. 3.92, SDs = 3.27 and 2.49,
respectively).
A 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA on the voice manipulation check
yielded only a significant main effect of procedural justice,
F(1, 139) = 507.91, p \ .001, g2 = .79: Participants in the
voice condition felt that they were listened to more than
those in the no voice condition (Ms = 5.52 vs. 1.34,
SDs = 1.40 and 0.75, respectively). Also, a 2 9 2 9 2
ANOVA on the average fairness score only yielded a
significant main effect of procedural justice, F(1,
139) = 106.90, p \ .001, g2 = .44: Participants with a
voice felt that they were treated more fairly than those in
the no voice condition (Ms = 4.84 vs. 2.35, SDs = 1.47
and 1.44, respectively).
Self-esteem
A 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA on the average self-esteem score
yielded, first of all, and in line with hypothesis 1, a signif-
icant main effect of procedural justice, F(1, 139) = 8.40,
p \ .001, g2 = .06: Self-esteem was higher when voice was
given relative to no voice (Ms = 4.54 vs. 3.81, SDs = 1.43
and 1.78, respectively). Again, a significant main effect of
emotion was also found, F(1, 139) = 9.13, p \ .005,
g2 = .06: Self-esteem was higher when disgust was recalled
relative to fear (Ms = 4.56 vs. 3.80, SDs = 1.57 and 1.65,
respectively). Analyses also revealed a significant interac-
tion between emotion and procedural justice (Hypothesis
2), F(1, 139) = 6.96, p \ .01, g2 = .05, and between per-
spective and procedural justice, F(1, 139) = 3.99, p \ .05,
g2 = .03. Most importantly, however, a significant three-
way interaction emerged, F(1, 139) = 3.78, p = .05,
g2 = .03 (see Table 2).
To analyze this interaction further, we examined the
two-way interaction between emotion and procedural jus-
tice at each level of the independent variable Perspective.
In line with hypothesis 3 that the interaction between
emotion and procedural justice (as was found in experi-
ment 1) would be a function of the type of self-perspective,
these analyses showed that the interaction between emotion
and procedural justice was significant in the self-immersed
perspective condition, F(1, 139) = 10.42, p \ .005, but
not in the self-distanced condition, F(1, 139) \ 1, p \ .63.
Table 2 Means and standard deviations of self-esteem as a function
of perspective, emotion, and procedural justice
Perspective Procedural justice Emotion
Fear Disgust
Self-immersed Voice 4.68a (1.35) 4.61a (1.58)
No voice 2.31b (0.92) 4.53a (1.78)
Self-distanced Voice 4.32a (1.35) 4.53a (1.49)
No voice 3.92a (1.87) 4.58a (1.52)
Note: A higher score indicates higher self-esteem. Standard deviations
are given in parentheses. Means with a different subscript differ at
p \ .05
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Further analyses of the two-way interaction between
emotion and procedural justice at the level of the self-
immersed condition showed that the effect of procedural
justice was significant when participants recalled the
emotion fear, F(1, 139) = 21.40, p \ .001, but not when
they recalled the emotion of disgust, F(1, 139) \ 1,
p \ .88. As expected, in the fear condition, self-esteem
was higher when voice was given rather than no voice.
Further, the effect of emotion was significant in the no
voice condition, F(1, 139) = 19.85, p \ .001, but not in
the voice condition, F(1, 139) \ 1, p \ .89. That is, in the
no voice condition, self-esteem was higher in the disgust
condition than in the fear condition. We will return to this
latter finding in the general discussion.
General discussion
Taken together, the present findings showed that the
enactment of fair procedures has a positive effect on self-
esteem, but particularly so when the emotion of fear rela-
tive to disgust is recalled. This effect of fear versus disgust
was particularly pronounced when the emotion was recal-
led from a self-immersed rather than a self-distanced
perspective. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the
most important implications.
The first important finding of the present research con-
cerns the observation that discrete emotions moderated the
effect of procedural justice on self-esteem. Indeed, proce-
dural justice promoted participants’ self-esteem, but
particularly when an uncertainty-associated emotion (e.g.
fear), relative to a certainty-associated emotion (e.g. dis-
gust), was recalled. This finding supports the idea that
discrete emotions can serve as a lens through which people
evaluate subsequent social information such as the fairness
of decision making procedures (cf. Lerner et al. 2004). One
specific type of appraisal that is particularly relevant to
procedural justice is uncertainty (Van den Bos and Lind
2002). Therefore, we expected and indeed found that dis-
crete emotions eliciting an uncertainty appraisal (e.g. fear)
reinforced procedural justice effects.
A second important finding is that the influence of fear
versus disgust on the effects of procedural justice was
particularly influential when participants adopted a self-
immersed rather than a self-distanced perspective. Both
theoretical and empirical analyses have suggested that
particularly uncertainty with respect to the self moderates
the effects of fairness of procedures (De Cremer and
Sedikides 2005), and that the effects of justice become
stronger when self-focus is heightened (Skitka 2003). In
addition, recent research (see Kross et al. 2005) has also
shown that the type of self-perspective that people adopt
influences their reactions to an anger-eliciting interpersonal
experience like unfair treatment. Our results are thus sup-
portive of these previous insights as we indeed show that
discrete emotions install an interpretative frame of uncer-
tainty which moderates the effect of procedural justice on
self-esteem, and particularly so when the emotion is
recalled within a self-immersed perspective.
The present data also yielded some other interesting
observations. First, across both experiments our emotion
manipulation moderated self-esteem in the no voice con-
dition, but not in the voice condition. This effect does not
corroborate the widely shared assumption that justice
effects should be considered ‘‘fair process’’ effects. That is,
in the procedural justice literature scholars typically
interpret fairness manipulations in terms of fairness rather
than unfairness (see Bies and Tripp 2002). However, evi-
dence is accumulating that people tend to be stronger
affected by unfair than by fair events (see Tripp and Bies
2007, for an overview). As a result, it would be more
appropriate to talk about the psychology of injustice rather
than of justice (De Cremer and Ruiter 2003). Our present
findings indeed support the idea of the ‘‘unfair process’’
effect as the impact of recalling an uncertainty-related
versus a certainty-related emotion only yielded a signifi-
cant effect when participants were treated unfairly. In fact,
our results showed that self-esteem reports were lowest in
the fear/no voice condition.
Another interesting finding relates to the observation
that in Experiment 1 procedural justice had a significant
effect on self-esteem in the disgust condition, whereas this
was not the case in the second experiment (in both the self-
immersed and self-distanced condition). This inconsistent
finding raises the question whether our emotion manipu-
lation did more than simply eliciting uncertainty versus
certainty appraisals. In response to such a question, it is,
first of all, important to note that our results provided
convincing evidence that the emotion manipulations of fear
and disgust were affecting uncertainty appraisals in the
experimental context (see also Tiedens and Linton 2001).
Furthermore, it is clear that the pattern of findings is con-
sistent with the prediction of the uncertainty management
model that procedural justice effects become stronger in
the context of uncertainty. Moreover, many procedural
justice studies have shown that not every single moderator
variable completely rules out the effect of the voice
manipulation on the dependent variable under investigation
(as is the case in Experiment 1). This effect found in
Experiment 1 is presumably caused by the pervasiveness of
the voice effect and its direct impact on the self. Thus,
overall, our findings can be interpreted in terms of the
affective uncertainty–certainty dimension that we intro-
duced in the present paper. Nevertheless, the finding that
voice sometimes revealed an effect on self-esteem when
disgust was primed makes clear the necessity for future
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research to delineate more precisely the extent to which the
specific emotion of disgust (relative to fear) elicits
appraisals that make people responsive to social informa-
tion such as (un)fair treatment.
To summarize so far, our results should be considered
important for the following reasons. First, our findings
demonstrate that it is worthwhile to use discrete emotions
as moderators of procedural justice effects. The use of
discrete emotions allows us to examine the influence of
affective states beyond their sheer valence, but, maybe
even more importantly, helps us to test in a more direct
manner why procedural justice matters to people. Indeed,
as evinced by the present experiments, the discrete emo-
tions of fear and disgust elicited specific appraisals that
acted as proxies of uncertainty versus certainty, thereby
providing further evidence that procedural justice effects
are closely linked to the motive of uncertainty (Van den
Bos and Lind 2002). Second, research to date only looked
at cognitive (Van den Bos 2001; Van den Bos and Mie-
dema 2000) or motivational (De Cremer and Sedikides
2005) uncertainty-related variables, but our findings show
that the emotional dimension of uncertainty also plays a
role in this process. Third, our research further contributes
to the idea that procedural justice rules such as voice affect
people’s motives and self because they communicate self-
relevant information (De Cremer and Tyler 2005). Indeed,
the present effects of procedural justice on self-esteem
were particularly pronounced when adopting an immersed
self-perspective. Of course, in the present research, we did
not include other dependent measures and therefore we
have to remain cautious in emphasizing the important role
of the self in appraisals and its impact on procedural justice
effects. Therefore, future research should examine the role
of the self in the interactive effect between procedural
justice and discrete emotions and to include other depen-
dent measures like, for example, cooperation and
relationships with the group authority and other team
members (cf. De Cremer and Tyler 2005).
Finally, both our main findings and prior ones seem to
feed into the conclusion that different psychological
dimensions are involved in the moderating influence of
uncertainty on procedural justice effects. Indeed, cognitive,
motivational and emotional components of uncertainty
seem able to enhance procedural justice effects and thus an
integrative approach seems most warranted when further
unraveling the relationship between uncertainty and justice.
We hasten to say that this conclusion should not come as a
surprise since social psychologists have demonstrated that
cognition and affect often interact in predicting human
behavior (Forgas 2000) and justice judgments (Van den
Bos 2003), and that cognition is often motivated (Kru-
glanski 1996). We therefore believe that justice effects
should not understood solely in terms of cognition,
emotion, or motivation, but that all these processes mutu-
ally influence each other.
Some possible limitations also need to be outlined. A
possible limitation is that the present research only used
specific emotions with a negative valence (i.e. fear and
disgust) and refrained from using emotions with a positive
valence. One may then wonder whether similar effects
would have been found if positive emotions with certainty
versus uncertainty appraisals were used. This may well be
the case as research by Tiedens and Linton (2001) showed
that certainty dimension, and not valence, mattered in
explaining the effects of specific emotions. Nevertheless, it
would be interesting for future research to examine this
issue in greater detail.
Another possible limitation is that we did not include a
control condition in our experimental designs. Including
such a control condition could further clarify the specific
effects of our emotion manipulations. However, our pri-
mary aim was to investigate whether specific emotions
differing in their level of uncertainty appraisal would
influence the impact of voice on people’s responses in a
similar way as found in previous studies using cognitive or
motivational operationalizations of uncertainty. While our
results were supportive of this ‘affective moderating’
effect, it would be interesting for future research to
investigate whether a baseline condition eliciting no cer-
tainty or uncertainty appraisals would reveal weaker
procedural justice effects on self-esteem relative to a fear
condition and stronger effects relative to a disgust
condition.
A final possible limitation is that we only focused on one
instance of unfair treatment, that is, voice. We decided to
do this because the operationalization of voice has received
the greatest attention in the literature and it is the most
effective and accepted manipulation of procedural justice.
However, Leventhal (1980) identified several procedural
justice criteria (e.g. consistency, correctability, ethicality,
accuracy), and, in their meta-analysis, Cohen-Charash and
Spector (2001) pointed out that ‘‘although we have enough
data on some aspects ... (e.g. voice), we do not have enough
data on other aspects ..., such as correctability and repre-
sentativeness’’ (p. 308). Therefore, it would be interesting
to see whether the moderating effect of uncertainty-asso-
ciated versus certainty-associated emotions also emerges
when using another procedural justice manipulation.
To conclude, the current investigation establishes
(un)certainty-associated emotions as important moderators
of responses to variations in procedural justice. Our results
showed that if people recall the emotion of fear (relative to
disgust), their self-esteem is particularly influenced as a
reaction to procedural fairness. Importantly, though, this
interactive effect between emotion certainty and procedural
justice was a function of the type of self-perspective that
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people adopted. We hope that the present investigation will
spark additional forays into the relation between emotions,
uncertainty and procedural justice.
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